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I. The Triangle of European Defense Integration 
Notwithstanding Europe’s historic heritage, a fully harmonized and 
independent ‘European Security and Defense Union’ (ESDU) is a 
prerequisite for the European Union’s (EU) mainstay as a capable and 
influential international actor, its own security, and ultimately that of the 
United States (US). As the world’s single most cohesive military alliance, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has traditionally been the 
sole legitimate medium through which the EU and US ensure security 
throughout Europe. European defense and security have thus been deeply 
entrenched in a longstanding US-centric power structure through the 
security guarantor of NATO. In the ensuing assessment of blockages to 
forging such a ESDU, one can first envision a ‘triangle of European 
integration’ with a political apex at the top representing the commanding 
capacity of politics to shape and often override legal and economic aspects 
of integration, and with one legal and one economic base point at the 
bottom of the triangle. Predominantly, it is this political apex within the 
triangle of European defense integration to blame for the EU’s reticence 
and sluggishness in establishing a fully harmonized ESDU. Therefore, with 
politics as the greatest obstacle to European defense integration, a fully 
operational defense union will be stillborn until member states come to 
terms with one another politically while applying the permitted legal 
foundations and convincing economic rationale to the debate on defense. 
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Never has there been a more exciting and opportune time for European 
defense with the recent activation of PESCO  (Permanent Structured 
Cooperation), so it is high time for this discussion. 
II.  Recalling Europe’s Historic Legacy 
The story of European defense integration really begins with the scourge of 
the Two World Wars. Though rather rudimentary in its inception, defense 
integration was already well underway in Europe before the EU was 
deemed a legitimate de jure entity in 1949 with the formation of NATO 
after the Vandenberg Resolution’s passing by the US Senate in 19481. In its 
rise to pre-eminent global leadership, it was not long before the US 
propped Europe back onto its feet with economic stimulus via the Marshall 
Plan and militarily through NATO. These two major catalysts, which 
remedied Europe’s perils, soon precipitated the US’ materialization as ‘the’ 
global hegemon whereby a new global order had been born. Much to its 
dismay, the US soon found itself deeply entrenched in European woes as it 
began to wave a sizeable wand in international affairs. While the Marshall 
Plan had re-stimulated the ravaged economies of Western European 
nations, NATO had brought military security to Europe which eventually 
led to an unintentional2 security dependence of Europe on the US. This 
cycle of security dependence remains intact to this day and has since 
curtailed the development of a fully harmonized European defense policy. 
As the Schuman Plan and European Coal and Steel Community fostered a 
cooperative spirit throughout Europe, it was not until the Korean War 
during which the North Koreans trespassed the 38th parallel division into 
the South was Europe obliged to rethink its entire security framework. One 
might ponder the relevance of this international infringement to the debate 
on European defense, but it was in fact the Korean War which brought 
security to the fore in Europe when the US and Western Europe recognized 
the pertinence of German rearmament and the forging of a cohesive 
 
1  Wyatt-Walter, Holly, The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979-
92, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997, p. 17. 
2  Ibid., p. 18. 
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alliance3 as critical solutions to the patchy security vacuum left by the 
Second World War. North Korean hostility had ingrained the West vs. East 
mentality between the US and Soviet Union (USSR) following the War 
with Europe caught betwixt two clashing superpowers in a new bipolar 
global order.  
Pressured by the US to keep Germany in check under this period of 
security re-structuring, France proposed the ‘Pleven Plan’ in October 1950 
to oversee potential German rearmament and to ensure that any further 
German military resurgence would solely serve the purpose of European 
integration under close French purview. The Pleven Plan essentially called 
for the creation of a European army and initiated the European Defense 
Community (EDC), both of which proposals later proved to no avail and 
quickly fizzled into contentious political issues due to flaky commitments 
and differentiation amongst the US and member states regarding their 
constructs4. While Jean Monnet’s EDC proposal gained initial momentum 
and backing by the US, signing the EDC Treaty in 1952 backfired when all 
treaty signatories except for France agreed to ratify the treaty. This 
rejection of the EDC Treaty by France in 1954 out of concern for its 
national sovereignty constitutes one of the longest standing arguments 
against European defense integration with defense as the last “bastion of 
the nation-state”. While France ironically supported European integration 
though it refused to ratify the EDC Treaty, it was the self-preservation of 
its national interests and colonial roots in Indochina that demonstrated early 
on how the military identity of a European state 5  would embody a 
significant political blockage to European defense integration under the 
existing US-NATO power structure already providing Europe with 
security. 
Despite the EDC’s failure in 1954, the 1950s and 1960s were contrarily a 
period of rapid boom for defense gains in the transatlantic alliance. Perhaps 
out of resentment for Anglo-American leverage in the European security 
 
3  Ibid., p. 20. 
4  Ibid., p. 21-27. 
5  Ibid., p. 27. 
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framework held by the US and UK, French President Charles de Gaulle 
introduced the Fouchet Plan in 1961 which added a predominantly French 
flavor to the dimension of European security cooperation by attempting to 
include defense and foreign policy within it. The Fouchet Plan strove to 
wean Europe off its dependency on the US and promote 
intergovernmentalism while steering Europe away from supranationalism. 
When De Gaulle realized that he could not uproot NATO, the Fouchet Plan 
eventually withered and was soon surpassed by the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s, which sought to coordinate the foreign 
policies of member states6 without overriding state sovereignty. It was also 
succeeded by the Western European Union (WEU) in the 1980s, the salient 
entity for security and defense matters of its time. It was thus conceived 
early on that the preservation of state sovereignty would pose a great 
political obstacle to European defense integration under the existing US-
NATO power structure. 
Paradoxically, the Cold War appears to have thwarted European defense 
integration yet simultaneously invoke more fruitful defense initiatives as a 
result. While the 1950s and 1960s did not pan out according to plan with 
the unsuccessful EDC and Fouchet Plan, the 1990s brought a series of 
crises to Europe which nurtured defense integration and the eventual 
implementation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). As 
the USSR squirmed in steep economic decline during the 1970s despite the 
illusions it preferred to portray, the Berlin Wall finally crumbled in 1989. 
This momentous occasion enabled German reunification in 1990, and 
allowed the inevitable implosion of the USSR in 1991 and breakup of 
Yugoslavia. As Soviet communism evaporated in Europe’s backyard, the 
collapse of the USSR had consequently removed a long-standing obstacle 
to European defense integration by allowing Europeans to rethink their 
global role7 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, proposals in 
 
6  Ibid., p. 33. 
7  Larivé, Maxime H. A., Debating European Security and Defense Policy 
Understanding the Complexity, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, p. 51. 
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the mid-1990s 8  for a European Security and Defense Identity and 
Combined Joint Task Forces in addition to a more cohesive Union. The 
milestone Maastricht Treaty introduced the ‘three-pillar structure’ which 
included the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as its second 
pillar, and brought forth a dimension of external affairs to the Union. 
Shortly after this institutional breakthrough, a series of crises unfolded in 
Europe’s eastern neighborhood and beyond its territory during which the 
CSDP was furthered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, 
the Gulf War in 1991, the Bosnian War between 1992 and 1995, the 
Kosovo War between 1998 and 1999, and additional external wars taking 
place in Africa and the Middle East circa the same timeframe. Such conflict 
in Europe’s vicinity and across the Mediterranean compelled the European 
Community (EC) to internalize its geopolitical strategy and extend the 
applicable reach of the CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP). As London and Paris closely monitored Berlin under NATO and 
US scrutiny in the years following German reunification, European defense 
and security maturation henceforth continued. A salient climax in the long 
road to European defense integration was the Saint Malo Declaration in 
1998 between Britain and France. Saint Malo was instrumental as it 
consisted of a joint effort by France and the UK to add a dimension of 
peacekeeping and crisis-management intervention to the European defense 
framework. Shortly thereafter, a series of European Councils took place 
between 1999 and 2000 in Helsinki, Cologne, and Nice as well as Santa 
Maria da Feira to enhance European defense policy. Notably, the idea of a 
European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was first introduced at the 
Helsinki Summit in 1999 which would permit the deployment of 60,000 
troops within thirty days’ notice in response to outbreaking crises, and was 
thereupon labeled a ‘Battlegroup’ (BG) of 2,000 troops to be deployed 
within five days’ notice9 . While Europe thought it had seen its worst 
 
8  Howorth, Jolyon, and John Keeler (eds.), Defending Europe: The EU, NATO, and 
the quest for European autonomy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 8. 
9  Allen, T.S., “The Fantasy of European Defense: An American Perspective”, Policy 
Exchange, December 11, 2016, online at: https://policyexchange.org.uk/the-
fantasy-of-european-defence-an-american-perspective/. Last accessed: January 23, 
2018.  
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breaches of security imaginable during the Second World War, the Cold 
War, and on its own doorstep in the Balkans, it was later compelled to 
reconsider its security arrangement once again following the catastrophic 
scenes coming out of New York City on 9/11.  
As 9/11 shattered global trust for both sides of the Atlantic, the US soon 
waged the “War on Terror” (WOT) in the Middle East, which naturally had 
profound implications for the EU as it did not concur with US foreign 
policy for the first time. The WOT prompted the EU to develop the 
Helsinki Headline Goal of 2003 which set a capabilities target for a fully 
deployable fleet of 60,000 troops to respond within 60 days for at least one 
year with adequate intelligence, logistics, combat support, command and 
control capabilities, and air and naval options.10 Following suit came the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, which acknowledged a new 
emerging concept of defense within Europe and called for the increase of 
civilian and military-led operations. It also prefaced the establishment of 
the European Defense Agency (EDA) in 2004 to improve crisis 
management capabilities, and emphasized the EU’s collective strength in 
numbers as well as its need to manage defense resources amongst member 
states more effectively11. The Union made further piecemeal progress in 
defense via the launch of its first two military crisis management missions, 
Operation Concordia (EUFOR Concordia) in Macedonia and Operation 
Artemis (ARTEMIS) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003.  
After these advancements, the EU was later plagued by the Eurocrisis in 
2008 and the ensuing American Great Recession which had wrought the 
gravest global financial crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. That 
same year, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy (RIESS) was released, which aimed to reinforce the ESS from 
2003 and implement viable improvements to the existing security and 
defense framework. The RIESS calls to attention various security threats 
 
10  European Union, European Council, “Background – Development of European 
Military Capabilities: The Force Catalogue 2006”, News release, 2006, online at: 
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2007/1/9/015eb683-75fd-4586-a717-
5920a4bc9b17/publishable_en.pdf. Last accessed: January 23, 2018.  
11  European Union, European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European 
Security Strategy, Brussels: European Council, 2003, p. 1-14. 
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mounting in the mid to late 2000s which still loom to this day such as the 
proliferation of WMD in rogue states like Iran and North Korea, global 
terrorism, the remnants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), 
organized transnational crime, hybrid warfare, energy security in the EU 
and its eastern neighborhood, and global climate change 12 . While the 
Eurocrisis set Europe off course of its defense integration, the 
establishment of the EDA and the RIESS, nevertheless, were integral 
stepping stones to greater defense integration. 
Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 gave the EU a greater legal 
persona and expanded the CFSP framework by establishing the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 and widened the role of High 
Representative (HR) of the Union for the Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy position, currently held by Federica Mogherini. Furthermore, the 
Lisbon Treaty outlined new extensive provisions on the CSDP in Articles 
42 to 46 of the TEU, ranging from but not limited to granting the Union 
civilian and military capabilities for the possibility of member states to 
partake voluntarily in the PESCO doctrine.13 While the 2000s brought forth 
many significant developments such as the transformation of the ESDP into 
the CSDP via the Lisbon Treaty, the 2010s have introduced the most recent 
landmarks in European defense integration with forward gusto. The Ghent 
Initiative rolled out by Germany and Sweden in 2010 aims to preserve and 
improve national operational capabilities of member states via 
effectiveness, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency 14 . 
Recently, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 composed 
by Mogherini lays down urgent and ambitious goals for growth in the 
 
12  European Union, EEAS Strategic Planning, Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels: 
European Union, 2008, p. 1-12, online at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf. Last accessed: January 23, 
2018. 
13  European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, June 07, 
2016/C, 202/38-41,  online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? 
uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT. Last accessed: January 23, 2018. 
14  European Defense Agency, Fact Sheet, p. 1, online at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/ 
docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/final-p-s_30012013_factsheet_cs5_gris.  
Last accessed: January 18, 2018.  
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European defense sector via: increased investments in capabilities, stronger 
defense cooperation between member states, the creation of a solid defense 
industry, more responsiveness of the CSDP and strengthened defense 
capabilities among member states. It also urges autonomy for member 
states to act in accordance with their state sovereignty, a more credible 
defense industry with greater effectiveness, efficiency and trust between 
member states, the optimum use of natural resources between participants, 
mutual adaptation of national defense planning cycles and capability 
development practices to enhance strategic convergence between member 
states, full application of the EDA, improved civilian protection, deeper 
coordination with NATO in capabilities development, higher paid defense 
expenditures by member states, a firm European defense technological and 
industrial base (EDTIB) as developed in the 2007 Strategy for the 
European Defense Technological and Industrial Base 15  based on a 
transparent internal market, and finally, the promotion of security of supply 
and dialogue within the defense industry 16 . Following the EUGS, the 
Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1 (EUGSY1) report has since 
also been drafted in 2017 by Mogherini, which touts that the EU has 
achieved more in security and defense in the last ten months than the past 
ten years17 by pushing for stronger EU cooperation between member states 
within the defense sector. 
 
  
 
15  European Defense Agency, A Strategy for the European Defense Technological 
and Industrial Base, 2017, p. 1-7, online at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-
do/our-current-priorities/strategies/Technologicalandindustrialbase. Last accessed: 
January 23, 2018. 
16  Mogherini, Federica, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels: 
European Union, 2016, p. 1-52, online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/ 
top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. Last accessed: January 18, 2018. 
17  Mogherini, Federica, From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the 
EU Global Strategy Year 1, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy, Brussels: European Union, 2017, p. 1-33, online at: 
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf. 
Last accessed: January 23, 2018. 
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III. Assessing the Blockages within the Political Apex 
With a wide gap between the fields of academia and policy-making18 as 
another sizeable obstacle to European defense integration, there are yet four 
core political blockages to harmonizing a fully operational ESDU. They are 
lack of political will, traditional “NATO-first” reflexes, conservative 
defense industry policies, and military cooperation fragmentation 19 . 
Additionally, Special Advisor on European Defense and Security Policy 
Michel Barnier underscores the differing defense priorities between 
member states whereby the UK has been reticent towards defense 
integration since the start in contrast to Germany, France and the Benelux 
nations; whereas Italy, Spain and Poland express a more open attitude to it. 
While France emphasizes an executive and expeditionary approach, 
Germany exudes greater reluctance to deploy troops due to unsettling 
memories of its dark past. Furthermore, EU member states sharing borders 
with Russia (RU) are geared more towards traditional territorial defense 
initiatives whereas southern member states on the Mediterranean prioritize 
terrorist threats emanating from North Africa and the Middle East20. Such 
divergences in security priorities between the member states result from 
geography and geopolitics, and therefore pose yet another blockage to a 
streamlined defense trajectory. 
Diverging considerably in defense doctrines and security prioritization, one 
of the most drawn-out political blockages for the EU has been the 
“traditional NATO-first instinct”, according to the European Political 
Strategy Centre’s Strategic Notes, which is residual from the Cold War era 
and was hashed out by the US to keep Europe at arm’s length because of its 
 
18  Wilkinson, Benedict, Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, and Erin Montague, 
“Navigating the Unknown: Barriers to Evidence-Based Defense and Security 
Policy in the European Union”, The International Spectator, Vol. 52, No. 1, 
February 1, 2017, p. 88-99, online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729. 
2017.1256931. Last accessed: January 23, 2018. 
19  Barnier, Michel, “In Defense of Europe–Defense Integration as a Response to 
Europe’s Strategic Moment”, European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), EPSC 
Strategic Notes, No. 4, 2015, online at: https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/ 
files/strategic_note_issue_4_en.pdf. Last accessed: January 23, 2018. 
20  Ibid., p. 4. 
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transgressions during both World Wars. Consequently, autonomous 
European ambitions to forge a community of mutual strategic and defense-
industrial interests were initially suppressed but this has since changed due 
to the US’ strategic foreign policy shift to ‘the pivot’ in Asia under the 
Obama Administration and Donald Trump’s recent invocation of ‘fair 
burden-sharing’ which mandates that underperforming NATO stakeholders 
meet the organization’s defense expenditure quota of 2% of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Not to mention, NATO’s Smart Defense and the EU’s 
Pooling and Sharing (P&S) program have both been met with fervent 
national conservatism and resistance despite a deepened NATO-EU 
strategic partnership and joint efforts within the Alliance thanks to the 
Berlin Plus Agreement of 2003, which enables the EU to access NATO’s 
capabilities for handling crisis management operations in the EU. Thus 
with such national “reflexes” still blocking supranational defense 
cooperation, European defense market fragmentation has also resulted in 
much inefficient cooperation between member states 21 . Despite EU 
Directive 2009/81/EC on defense procurement and Directive 2009/43/EC 
on intra-EU transfers of defense products to liberalize defense markets and 
make them more efficient and competitive, member states can still bypass 
these legally non-binding thresholds by reinforcing national industry ‘state 
champions 22 ’, and thus deviate from converging European security 
concerns. In light of these formidable political obstacles to European 
defense integration, the impacts of Brexit, RU’s geopolitical calculations 
and US foreign policy also have profound implications for the debate on 
defense. Above all, the greatest loss to common defense by Brexit will be 
the extraordinary military capabilities that Britain offers as it comprises 
approximately 20%23 of the EU’s total capabilities making it Europe’s most 
 
21  Ibid., p. 6. 
22  Koenig, Christian, and Bernhard von Wendland, The Art of Regulation: 
Competition in Europe: Wealth and Wariness, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2017. 
23  Major, Claudia, and Alicia von Voss, “European defense in view of Brexit: 
Europe’s military power might not suffer, but its political clout is at risk”, Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017/4, p. 2, online at: https://www.swp-berlin. 
org/-fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C10_mjr_vos.pdf.  
Last accessed: January 18, 2018. 
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indispensable European partner in terms of security and military 
cooperation 24 . On the one hand, the presently known and unknown 
consequences of Brexit on EU defense groundwork are bound to impair the 
EU’s political capacity to act collectively, decrease the already fragile trust 
Europeans had in defense policy to begin with, make the EU a more 
fragmented and inward-looking entity, and further differentiate tasks 
between NATO and the EU25. On the other hand, authors Major and Voss 
project that Brexit will not prove deleterious to the CSDP as it will likely 
shore up its capacities, albeit, only in crisis management and security, not 
defense. If anything, Brexit has tested the EU’s credibility in defense as a 
considerable blockage and will have narrow implications on the existing 
US-NATO power structure. 
The issue of defense is a rather timely issue in a post-Brexit Union. While 
Britain still has much to hash out with the EU in their messy “divorce”, and 
while the Franco-German relationship comes under pressure to spearhead 
European integration, the worst ways in which Brexit can mangle EU 
defense are further depressions in cooperation in trust. Lower cooperation 
and trust stall defense integration since Europeans must subsequently opt 
for either a staunch French nationalist military outlook or a strong German 
industrial base. External bilateral defense cooperation initiatives, however, 
such as those between Britain and France brought forth by the Lancaster 
House Treaties of 2010 should not wither away26 as bilateralism between 
nations in general will not cease anytime in the foreseeable future. 
Although direct bilateral relations between Britain and France will not be 
strained solely by Brexit, one of the most profound obstacles is Brexit’s 
effect(s) on the European defense production industry given that the wings 
of Airbus aircraft are manufactured in Wales and that workers accustomed 
to circulating freely between the two countries might face hassles going 
 
24  Ghez, Jeremy, Magdalena Kirchner, Michael Shurkin, Anna Knack, Alex Hall, and 
James Black, “A snapshot of international perspectives on the implications of the 
UK’s decision to leave the EU”, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017, p. 11, 
online at:.https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE225/ 
RAND_PE225pdf. Last accessed: January 18, 2018. 
25  Major/von Voss, op. cit., p. 1-4. 
26  Ghez/Kirchner/Shurkin/Knack/Hall/Black, op. cit., p. 5-7.  
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forward. More importantly, the leadership gap by Britain in defense 
cooperation will be felt among member states since it has historically led 
the pack in defense. Moreover, if the failed merger between British 
Aerospace Electronic Systems (BAE Systems) and the multinational 
European corporation Airbus (EADS) in 201227 is any indicator of lack of 
British and continental European cooperation pre-Brexit, then the prospects 
of continued cooperation are grim. The full detrimental effect of Brexit on 
European defense galvanization, however, certainly remains to be seen. 
From behind the glass, Brexit by no means smoothens out the creases of 
European integration. While it surely adds a knotty twist, it might have 
paradoxically invoked greater Europeanization in the CFSP, CSDP and 
PESCO28 in the meantime. This newfound cooperation could perhaps be 
more of a blessing in disguise and less of a political blockage to 
harmonizing an ESDU.  
Although Britain has historically expressed a lukewarm attitude towards 
the European project especially in utmost important matters of foreign 
policy, security and defense, its actions speak volumes of the will of its 
people who turned out to vote in the 2016 referendum. British attempts to 
block permanent military structures, geopolitical tepidity by Britain’s 
foreign policy leaders, institutional blockages within its own government, 
and high levels of Euroscepticism among its elder population 29  have 
determined the UK’s destiny as a non-EU European partner. Perhaps at the 
core of these ‘British blockages’ to European defense integration lies the 
rift between ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ philosophies with the former 
emphasizing NATO and healthy transatlantic ties, and the latter stressing a 
strong independent EU security actor30. Moreover, Brexit reduces the UK’s 
counter-terrorism and intelligence contributions to valuable European 
 
27  Ghez/Kirchner/Shurkin/Knack/Hall/Black, op. cit., p. 7-8. 
28  Kienzle, Benjamin, and Inez von Weitershausen, “Brexit has given an impetus to 
reshape Europe’s foreign, security and defense policies”, LSE Brexit, Defence 
Studies Department, King’s College London, 2017, p. 1, online at: https:// 
defenceindepth.co/2017/05/15/brexit-has-given-an-impetus-to-reshape-europes -
foreign-security-and-defence-policies/. Last accessed: January 18, 2018. 
29  Ibid., p. 2-3.  
30  Ibid., p. 3. 
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databases including Europol, Schengen Information System II, the Eurodac 
system for distinguishing between asylum seekers and illegal migrants, and 
Eurojust for interstate matters of judicial cooperation31. On the other side, 
the EU has lost easier access to British assets, as if there had ever been 
much ‘easy access’ for the EU to the longstanding bilateral ‘Special 
Relationship’ between the UK and US, covert British intelligence, or the 
exclusive Five Eyes intelligence alliance between the world’s foremost 
‘Anglo countries’: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
While Brexit will initially hamper the EU’s defense capacity, it will deter 
the UK from cooperating on a transatlantic global security framework with 
the rest of Europe and could estrange transatlantic ties32 between the EU 
and US with the UK having bridged the two. 
Apart from divergences in strategic culture, defense market fragmentation 
and mere lack of political will by member states, the US has long played 
both an invisible and visible hand in European politics since it came to the 
rescue of Europe after years of destruction. The US has historically 
alongside the UK, been skeptical of the EU’s defense capacity and political 
will despite doubly urging the EU to bolster its defense spending and 
burden-sharing since at least the Eisenhower Administration during which 
former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower once retorted that the 
Europeans were “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam33”. Interestingly, it is 
argued by Rees that the US encouraged the UK to view the EU as an 
illegitimate defense actor while it called for stronger military force 
deployability though suspicious of any efforts outside of NATO 
framework. The UK even endorsed the US by partaking in the European 
Capabilities Action Plan, but the US was in turn negatively impacting the 
UK’s views of the EU 34  in the suspenseful months prior to Brexit. 
 
31  Rees, Wyn, “America, Brexit and the security of Europe”, The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 2017, p. 563-564, online at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148117711400. Last accessed: 
January 18, 2018. 
32  Ibid., p. 567-569. 
33  Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 298. 
34  Rees, op. cit., p. 562. 
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Paradoxically, this authenticates the US as a potent political blockage to 
advancing European defense integration yet a simultaneous encourager of 
EU defense autonomy. 
Momentarily diverging from this train of thought, the differing structures of 
the American and European defense markets shall also be juxtaposed to 
help understand the stagnancy of European defense. The US has 
traditionally exhibited an autarkic defense market, meaning that the US 
seeks to maintain self-sufficiency and independence from the global market 
when it comes to any defense-related expenditure. Due to legal, military 
and economic constraints, the US defense market is barred from 
transitioning to an interconnected and global one. Legally, US export 
regulations require foreign companies to comply with strict US security 
regulations and fine them for non-compliance, while economically, US 
defense companies do not need to merge with foreign companies or create 
economies of scale due to their self-sufficiency. Needless to say, US 
national security is prioritized above profitability and efficiency. Europe, 
on the other hand, saw the emergence of transnational defense companies 
due to its economic integrational foundation. While Europe and the US 
would surely benefit from more American-European mergers, European 
firms collaborating with the US are constrained by rigid penalties for 
violating US security requirements, hence less cooperation 35 . US 
sequestration as an autarkic, realist defense actor in contrast to the EU as an 
interdependent, multinational defense actor is thus another blockade to 
furthering European defense integration as Europe still treats defense as a 
matter of state sovereignty with member states essentially relying on the 
traditional US-NATO power structure for defense. 
A turning point for Britain was when it decided to join bilateral efforts with 
the US during the 2003 WOT despite continental Europe’s bitterness 
towards this US policy under the Bush Administration. Under direction of 
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Tony Blair’s ministry, Britain came to view itself as an unwavering 
American ally, and therefore resonated more closely with the US than the 
EU with mainstream EU policy pitted against the WOT36. That said, the US 
single-handedly obstructed EU defense efforts by giving rise to a 
distinguished sentiment of ‘otherness’ across Britain, which eventually 
influenced its decision to leave the EU a decade later. It must thus be taken 
into account that the Special Relationship between Washington and London 
played a powerful role in shaping British perceptions of state sovereignty 
and self-identity in the 2016 British referendum. While the critical juncture 
of Brexit ultimately backfired on the Obama Administration’s desires, 
American Europeanists must too grapple with this setback as the US 
continues to maintain a ubiquitous presence in European defense matters. 
Similarly though of a different nature, RU poses a stifling threat to 
European defense integration yet paradoxically kindles the drive towards a 
more consolidated defense policy and exertion of hard power by the EU. 
Arguably, the most ominous security threat knocking on Europe’s 
backdoor is the Russian Federation, sitting atop rickety relations from the 
Cold War. With the West deeply perturbed about the ambiguous signals 
and conflicting messages emanating from Moscow, it is felt that the 
Kremlin is stirring revanchism, neo-imperialism, expansionism and 
hostility 37  to divide and conquer as seen by the cases of Ukraine and 
Crimea and other strips of territory on Europe’s eastern flank. As RU 
infringes upon the EU’s Eastern neighborhood territorially and engages in 
hybrid warfare, nuclear weaponry and conventional combat capabilities are 
vaunted by the Kremlin. This is enough to keep any subscriber to 
international affairs wide awake at night given that EU member states are 
at odds with one another amidst 27 distinct national security strategies. Due 
to mutual feelings of distrust and residual misunderstandings from the Cold 
War between the US and RU, Europe is nonetheless subject to each’s 
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power posturing. There is thus great cause for concern in Europe as RU 
engages in provocative behaviors whether out of genuineness or mere 
intimidation tactics to elicit recognition from the international community. 
Regardless of RU’s intentions and its suspected capabilities, it ultimately 
jeopardizes European security while Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 
thorny rhetoric must be taken seriously as it endangers the fragile European 
defense environment.  
While RU would think twice before daring to test Article 5 of NATO, it is 
yet undermining the transatlantic security framework by: threatening a 
military response should Sweden or Finland join NATO, possessing 
nuclear weaponry, engaging in hybrid warfare, having annexed Crimea in 
2014, invading Ukraine militarily, and enjoying expansive geography and 
manpower capacity. Compared to the Baltic States which have only 11 
infantry battalions, Russia boasts 22 battalions in its Western Military 
District (WMDT), 13 of which are tank, motorized, or mechanized 
infantry. With 10 artillery battalions in the WMDT, RU is able to exert 
longer ranges and rates of firepower than can NATO, which is significantly 
outgunned by the Kremlin and is deprived of tubed artillery, rocket 
launchers and surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In the air, NATO would 
also be at a slight disadvantage possessing 19 squadrons in contrast to RU 
possessing 27 deployable combat air squadrons alongside 6 battalions of 
assault helicopters. As stated by Sokolsky, RU is therefore able to wreak 
havoc with an immense and forceful attack equipped by its advanced 
armor, weapons, sensors, sophisticated air defense system and long-range 
direct fire systems. While it is perceived that the qualitative versus 
quantitative gap between NATO and RU has narrowed, the possibility of a 
Russian attack on Europe can never be ruled out as RU’s manpower could 
substantially inundate NATO. This leaves the EU extremely vulnerable in 
its defense capacity with Russian aggression as an ever-looming 
geopolitical obstacle38.  
Daunting as the prospect of a Russian attack on NATO may seem, it must 
also be entertained that RU’s air defense capabilities have dramatically 
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improved. Since RU has upgraded its A2/AD capabilities, it has also 
deployed new S-400 anti-aircraft systems, land-based coastal defense 
missile launchers, and nuclear-capable ship-based cruise missiles 39 . 
Meanwhile, RU has revised and improved its command structures, 
personnel, hardware, exercises, and the organization, training and 
equipment of troops alongside boosting combat readiness. In addition, RU 
has held consistent snap drills while the WMDT has assigned several 
mobile heavy ground force units under command of a corps-level 
headquarters. RU has also allegedly enhanced its rapid decision-making 
and its will to carry out large-scale offensive operations. More comforting, 
however, are the inspection reports which indicate that RU overstates its 
readiness levels and exaggerates its armaments equipment inventory 40 . 
RU’s leverage in manpower, long-range artillery and direct fire weapons 
systems, however, cannot be underestimated as they are adversarial 
challenges to EU defense integration despite Moscow’s blatant 
shortcomings in backwards Soviet-generation technology and strategic 
airlift capabilities41. 
While Putin knows his insurmountable boundaries with NATO and the US, 
hybrid warfare in recent years has become a new conduit for RU to seep 
through traditional defense mechanisms in Europe and beyond. This non-
kinetic soft power tool of modern warfare is disconcertingly advantageous. 
Firstly, hybrid warfare has become a mode of choice for the Kremlin due to 
its elusive and veiled nature. RU can deny any allegations of tampering 
with networks of other governments as most recently seen by Moscow’s 
meddling in both the US Democratic National Convention and 2016 
presidential election whereby a tripartite report42 between the US Central 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice and National Security Agency 
expressed high confidence that Putin indeed waged a hybrid warfare attack 
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to undermine public faith in the American democratic system, and to boost 
Trump’s likelihood of winning the election by defaming the already 
contentious reputation of Secretary Hillary Clinton by way of covert 
intelligence operations coupled with more overt efforts through Russian 
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, paid online 
“trolls” and digital online platforms. It can thus be affirmed that the 
conventional military capabilities and emerging hybrid warfare tactics 
possessed by RU must be effectively deterred by proportionate European 
defensive means. RU, with its leverage in such capabilities, comprises a 
lofty political obstacle to European defense integration by the 
conglomeration of security threats it poses to faith in liberal democracy. 
IV. The Legal Foundations and Economic Rationale 
behind an ESDU 
Although the political apex has stifled European defense integration the 
most, there are counterintuitively fewer gray areas in the legal and 
economic bases of the triangle, both of which edge the EU closer towards a 
common defense policy substantially more than the political apex. To begin 
with the legal base, Article 4 (2) of the TEU explicitly states that 
safeguarding national security “remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State43”. Flipping forward to Article 42 (3) of the TEU44, however, 
states that, “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their 
military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defense capabilities 
development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘the European Defense Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, 
shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to 
identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to 
strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defense sector, shall 
participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and 
 
43   European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 7 June 
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shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military 
capabilities”. Likewise, Article 42 (2) of the TEU45 stipulates that, “The 
common security and defense policy shall include the progressive framing 
of a common Union defense policy. This will lead to a common defense, 
when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”. It is thus 
legally evident that the Treaties themselves pave the legal way towards a 
common defense framework. It is assumed that these provisions were not 
only written with the ambition of forging an eventual ESDU, but that this 
would be the natural course of European defense integration to unfold. 
Achieving this required unanimity, though, takes the debate back to the 
political apex where any outcome ultimately rests on the political will of all 
member states for agreement. 
Shifting gears to the economic base of the triangle, there are several sound 
economic arguments for the EU to bolster its capabilities and interstate 
cooperation in the defense sector. In terms of increased military 
enhancement and military cooperation, it has been argued under different 
topoi why both are economic necessities for the EU. Within the topos of 
finances on the European defense debate, the standard argument centers 
around the dire need for member states to share the burden of costs 
associated with defense undertakings. As asserted by Kühnhardt 46 , 
institutional failures in defense integration were paradoxically 
advantageous in the long run for harmonizing defense as they led to 
stronger movements later on and furthered P&S of military equipment 
between member states. This demonstrates P&S as a viable economic 
vehicle for optimizing military capabilities and cooperation since national 
leaders can more easily defend defense cooperation based on economic 
savings rather than furthered political integration, a more heavily contested 
can of worms. The EU therefore exhibits liberal intergovernmentalism in 
this case, laid down by Andrew Moravcsik in 1998, in which member 
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states decide to integrate whenever it is economically logical to do so47. 
The economic rationale of P&S to enhance military capabilities and 
cooperation is therefore key to igniting a ESDU despite the long-standing 
political brick wall of state sovereignty. 
At the table of European defense integration is the centerpiece of military 
capabilities. As indicated above, P&S are means to the end of bolstering 
EU defense capacity with military capabilities. The P&S solution to “pool 
it or lose it”, once famously retorted by Lady Ashton, is seemingly the only 
means of enhancing these capabilities48 lest the EU lose them to national 
pride and protectionism if it does not collectively engage in P&S within a 
wider protectionist defense procurement market. To clarify, national 
protectionism is regarded by Europeanists as the anathema to a healthy and 
viable European procurement market whereas European protectionism is 
sought for the welfare of the entire single internal market. P&S therefore 
aligns with the existing principles of the Single Market and the broader 
story of European economic integration as opposed to protectionist national 
economic policies for defense, which obstruct Union progress in defense 
integration. 
It is argued by Mogherini in the EUGS 2016 that member states cannot 
afford to employ national defense policies since multilateral cooperation in 
defense boosts interoperability, effectiveness, and trust while it increases 
the output of defense spending. While recognizing the need to preserve 
national sovereignty, Mogherini acknowledges cooperation as a fruitful 
yield of the economic necessity for P&S of military capabilities 49 . 
Similarly, EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq argues that the reduction in 
national defense spending and equipment budgets prompts the need for 
increased spending cohesion amongst member states if the EU is to retain 
its capabilities with the goal of “providing security”. Complexly enough, 
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European defense cooperation relies on autarkic defense production despite 
the autarkic US sequestration of which the EU defense market should be 
weaned off. Subsequently, this leads to the discussion about EU strategic 
autonomy since there is no valid justification for the progressive 
improvement of military capabilities with P&S costs and resources as the 
only means of maintaining capabilities according to Heinikoski who 
analyzes the topos of usefulness, threat, responsibility, and law in an 
ambitious attempt to justify why increased European military capabilities 
are needed. By employing the topos of finances, Heinikoski asserts 
cooperation as the pith of the economic argument to maintaining military 
capabilities. It is to this end that the key to unlocking a fully harmonized 
and operational ESDU ultimately lies in the preservation of national state 
sovereignty as the greatest political blockage, and how much Ministers of 
Defense (MOD) are willing to cooperate on behalf of their countries for the 
greater good of the Union. 
To draw upon German-American political scientist Ernst Haas’ theory of 
neo-functionalism, the EU’s progress in the Single Market could indeed 
carry over into the defense sector via what is known as ‘positive spillover’. 
Given the European Commission’s (COM) recent establishment of the 
European Defense Action Plan (EDAP) in November 2016, one can gauge 
progress in European defense integration and by what means a fully 
harmonized ESDU is most viable on grounds of economic cooperation 
between member states in defense acquisition and procurement. Recently, 
the COM has launched the European Defense Fund (EDF) in June 2017 via 
the EDAP which supports investment in joint research and development 
(R&D) of defense equipment and technologies with a “research window” 
and “capability window”. The EDF under the EDAP also aims to further 
the development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in addition 
to other start-ups, mid-caps and suppliers in the defense industry, and to 
fortify the Single Market for defense 50  (SMD). Compelled by Brexit, 
France and Germany hosted a meeting in September 2016 for all MOD in 
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Bratislava which foreshadowed the EDF. In doing so, the MOD schemed 
an EDF that would harbor cost sharing for EU Battle Groups (EUBGs) and 
EU military missions of willing participants since defense cooperation is 
voluntary for member states according to Article 46 paragraphs 3 and 5 of 
the TEU51. Improving such cost sharing, however, pales in comparison to 
the Union’s ambition of creating an ‘EU army 52 ’, another formidable 
economic obstacle to defense integration. Not to mention, the EDF is 
projected not to interfere with the neutrality of non-NATO EU members. 
As regards increasing defense expenditures, the EU has preferred the 
optimization of defense-related expenses due to its costly past. While the 
US has indeed browbeaten European countries to boost their remarkably 
low defense expenditures to meet the minimum threshold set by NATO at 
2% of GDP, further feasibility of defense integration in the EU depends on 
other critical variables such as the fiscal latitude of member states, 
supranational European policy preferences versus centrifugal national 
policy preferences, and public opinion among EU citizens53. Given these 
challenges to picking apart ‘defense economics’, the focus on deepening 
European defense integration rests more on the efficient use of resources 
and increased interoperability, and ensuring that military expenditures such 
as those of R&D, acquisition, and procurement are not duplicated since 
Europe still falls strikingly short of this objective with 80% of all its 
equipment procurement occurring at the national level and with duplication 
rates of 25-100 billion EUR54 per year. Obviously, this is an appreciable 
waste of money and immense disregard for the savings a ‘defense economy 
of scale’ would bring, banking upon the relative success that has come with 
the Single Market. To illustrate the benefits that an SMD would bring the 
EU, savings of such a finalized mechanism would amount to approximately 
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600 million EUR for infantry vehicles and 500 million EUR for a collective 
system of ammunition certification. An SMD is thus a harbinger of a fully 
harmonized ESDU, assuming the EU can converge the billions of euros it 
squanders per annum in the duplication of resources and scattered spending 
pools. 
A helpful comparison of the autarkic US defense market as the founding 
facilitator of Europe’s security framework via NATO can help explain the 
EU’s sticky defense expenditure agglomeration. The average cost for 
deploying a European soldier on overseas military operations is 310,000 
thousand EUR higher than the same deployment of its US counterpart. That 
said, the EU could save upwards of 20.6 billion EUR per year were it to 
operate a fully interoperable European armed force. It is also staggering 
that the EU costs itself more than half of what the US costs itself, and is 
only able to exert a tenth of this capacity 55 . From an international 
standpoint, the EU has a long way to go in catching up with the US and 
other global superpowers if it is to be esteemed a credible security partner. 
It is also wise to be realistic about the unequivocal differences between the 
EU and the US with the former being a supranational collective decision-
making body, and the latter an actual nation-state abiding by the traditional 
Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. To demonstrate the chasm 
between the EU and US in defense savings, the EU invests 23,829 EUR per 
soldier for equipment procurement and R&D whereas the US invests 
102,264 EUR; as regards duplication of systems in use, the EU possesses 
154 types of weapon systems whereas the US possesses 27; the EU has 
17,160 units of armored personnel carrier and 37 such types while the US 
27,528 units but only 9 such types; the EU has 42 units and 12 types of air-
to-air refueling tanker aircraft meanwhile the US bears 550 units with 4 
types; and finally, the EU puts forth 1,703 units and 19 types of combat 
aircraft while the US boasts 2,779 units and only 11 types56. It is easily 
inferred from these figures the greater integration of US systems with 
substantially more units and fewer types than the EU. This is the 
conundrum of duplication in the EU, a major economic blockage to defense 
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integration with political undertones which can be remedied by increased 
Union capabilities for autonomous action and elimination of such futile 
redundancies57.  
V. Public Opinion Matters Indeed 
In light of this discussion on the predominant political obstacles to 
harmonizing a consolidated and joint ESDU, such an assessment would be 
incomplete without a survey of public opinion surrounding the debate. This 
is especially apropos given the overwhelming majority of European 
citizens who hold favorable views of deeper European defense integration. 
Although a single European army and common defense institutions have 
yet to materialize, the debate on defense should center equally around the 
expectations of European citizens, considering that approximately 7 in 10 
EU citizens have consistently backed the idea of a CSDP for over two 
decades, and even more so than the CFSP framework or Economic 
Monetary Union. Security is in high demand by constituents yet low in 
supply 58  due primarily to the political blockages discussed in previous 
passages. By honing in on public opinion, it is found that the variable of 
national identity is a principal determinant in shaping one’s support for the 
CSDP and an eventual single European army, and that the varying attitudes 
towards defense are shaped by pre-existing social representations of 
security59. To test this hypothesis, the authors of a survey separate different 
national strategic cultures into four social representations of security in the 
EU, known as ‘strategic postures’: pacifism, humanitarianism, 
traditionalism, and globalism. This classification of social representations 
stems from the American foreign policy positions conducted by Wittkopf, 
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which include four distinct groups: ‘internationalists’, ‘isolationists’, 
‘hardliners’, and ‘accommodationists’. 
Under the determinant of national identity, a citizen’s identification with 
the nation is deemed a symbolic predisposition that is cultivated early on in 
one’s life and bears an emotional attachment to his or her nation, thus 
bearing the potential to affect attitudes towards common European 
defense 60  favorably or unfavorably. An intriguing takeaway from these 
findings is how increased heterogeneity among citizens’ attitudes towards 
European defense might be due to differing psychological dispositions61 at 
the individual level. Psychological surveys would make a fruitful addition 
to supplementing existing findings on national identity as a determinant to 
help explain these divergences in strategic culture, but the problem 
encountered in this field of research is that Eurobarometer surveys are 
conducted sporadically, and these phenomena are often measured via proxy 
indicators. Therefore, more psychological surveys and regularly updated 
Eurobarometer reports would enhance the ability to gauge citizens’ 
attitudes and provide greater insight on the psychological subtleties lying 
beneath the shrouded surface of other determinants such as national 
identity or historic legacies. Limited Eurobarometer data62  thus inhibits 
European defense integration as it is known that most EU citizens are in 
favor of a more comprehensive defense package, yet research in this area is 
still lacking. Authors Endres, Mader and Schoen further suggest that the 
systematic clash between humanitarian internationalism and militarism in 
strategic culture contributes to the complexity of public opinion as the 
former advocates deeper defense insofar as it does not substitute national 
defense and is used to further humanitarian goals; while the latter centers 
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around preferences for global EU power projection in accordance with 
traditional territorial security and defense power relations63. 
As regards the four European strategic postures, the first of ‘pacifism’ 
encompasses individuals who believe that hard security and global 
influence must fade. Secondly, is the strategic posture of 
‘humanitarianism’, which engulfs individuals who subscribe to ‘soft 
security’ but maintain that Europe should play an active role in the world. 
The third posture of ‘traditionalism’ refers to individuals who adopt a 
traditional notion of security and hold that Europeans must prioritize issues 
affecting the Union. Finally, comes the strategic posture of ‘globalism’, 
which pertains to individuals who firmly believe the EU should take a 
stronger lead in global affairs by asserting its political and diplomatic 
semblance64. By surveying citizens’ views of European defense policy, the 
authors draw data from the Eurobarometer 54.1 (the ‘defense special’) of 
2000, the latest and most up-to-date database on citizens’ attitudes 
regarding defense. Researchers find a considerable degree of heterogeneity 
among the results in this survey with the largest strategic posture of 44% 
adhering to globalism, the second largest to traditionalism at 31%, and 
smallest degree to humanitarianism and pacifism ranking upwards of 10%. 
While compiled at the turn of the century, this set of data is still relevant 
because it is the most comprehensive compilation of citizens’ attitudes 
towards the CSDP to date65. These varying human perceptions of strategic 
culture via such ‘strategic postures’ thus also stall any forward defense 
acceleration. 
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VI. The Way Forward 
Stagnant defense integration can be attributed to a complex interplay of 
insecurity, enthusiasm and uncertainty by the EU as it faces an immense 
credibility crisis with a wide gap between its defense ambitions and the 
actual structures, tools and capabilities it has at its disposal. While it might 
be that the recent election of French President Emmanuel Macron can 
rekindle the spirit for European cooperation and incite prospects of 
renewed Franco-German leadership66 alongside German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel’s pro-European cooperative outlook, the recent surge of far-right 
party politics across Europe, Germany’s difficulty to forge a government 
coalition, and Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy are yet alarming 
reminders of the EU’s pending defense vacuum. More promising however, 
has been the EUGS, the EUGSY1, the EDAP, the EDF, the EU-NATO 
joint declaration of 2016 at the Warsaw Summit to bolster cooperation, the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) to improve the 
coordination of national defense plans, and the Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability (MPCC) to aid in the management of EU military 
operations. Even more auspicious has been the recent signing of a joint 
notification on PESCO by 23 member states in November 2017 and a 
milestone decision adopted by the Council in December 2017 to establish 
PESCO in which 25 member states have agreed to increase defense 
expenditures and undertake 17 joint projects of which some of the 
highlights include creating a pan-European military training center, 
improving capability development and fostering common standards for 
military radio communication67. Having been only one prior attempt to 
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invoke PESCO under Belgian Presidency 68  in 2010, it is this nascent 
awakening of “Sleeping Beauty” that is just the flick of the wand needed to 
transform the current hodgepodge of civilian missions and military 
operations into a streamlined ESDU. Integrated capabilities enhancements 
should therefore not stop at procurement but should extend to common 
program management, common logistics, common updates for common 
configuration, common doctrines, common deployment, and common 
training and exercise69.  
Prior to this unprecedented establishment of PESCO, a Council meeting in 
May 2017 took place in which MOD agreed upon a fund known as the 
Cooperative Financial Mechanism (CSM) under the umbrella of the EDA 
with around 19 participating member states sharing the objective of 
incentivizing defense cooperation to remedy the obstacle of budgetary 
disharmony 70 . Further ongoing defense initiatives include a ‘European 
Security Compact’ proposed by French and German MOD, a call for a 
permanent joint multinational military force by Italian MOD who had also 
called for a ‘Schengen of defense’ beforehand, and beckoning for a 
European Defense Union by the European Union People’s Party. During 
his 2016 State of the Union address, European COM President Jean-Claude 
Juncker called for the present day EDF in addition to having adamantly 
yearned for the creation of a legitimate single EU army for decades71. Yet 
despite 6 ongoing military operations, 9 civilian missions72 and widespread 
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support among European citizens with 72% 73  in favor of a common 
European security and defense policy as per 2015 Eurobarometer data, the 
momentum these initiatives have generated for the cyclical defense debate 
is thwarted by sharp divergences in strategic culture and lack of political 
will. Invoking the legal provisions of PESCO found in Articles 42 (6), 46 
of the TEU and Protocol 10, reaching a feasible level of budgetary 
harmony via the EDF, and increasing the extent to which member states 
engage in P&S are the most optimum solutions to establishing a ESDU. 
Despite permissive legal stipulations in the Treaties and economic flight 
via ‘defense economics’, the conglomeration of blockages to harmonizing a 
fully consolidated operational ESDU include: Diverging interests; the 
preservation of state sovereignty; reticence by member states; varying 
perceptions of the concept of ‘security’; cultural-linguistic divergences of 
perception behind the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘defense’; the Cold War; 
the breakup of Yugoslavia; the Balkan crises; 9/11; the 2008 global 
financial crisis; Russia and its marginal warfare leverage; the US as 
Europe’s paradoxical enabler yet disabler of growth; a staunch cleavage 
between the fields of academia and policy-making; differing strategic 
cultures and postures resulting in regional clustering of EUBGs; limited 
Eurobarometer data; the role of geography and geopolitics; divergences in 
security priorities between member states; structural defense market 
fragmentation; the implications of Brexit; US defense market sequestration; 
the long-standing Special Relationship between the US and UK; lack of 
cooperation among MOD; national protectionist economic policies; the 
duplication of EU defense resources; unreached consensus by member 
states; the ECB’s prohibition on monetary financing; the fiscal 
sustainability of the EDF and EDAP; and mutualization of cost sharing 
between member states. The most paramount political blockages of these 
include: Lack of political will, traditional “NATO-first” reflexes, 
conservative defense industry policies, and military cooperation 
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fragmentation. The EU’s quest towards a ESDU is therefore stalled by a 
slew of political obstacles as opposed to legal or economic ones. 
In grappling with all of these blockages, there are a myriad of actions the 
EU can take to ensure that the recent activation of PESCO is not rescinded. 
Member states can muster the political resolve needed under a balanced 
Franco-German axis of leadership by increasing quality-based defense 
research, by remaining open about the recent additions of the EDF and 
EDAP, by establishing a central European Operational Headquarters that 
oversees all its civilian missions, and by engaging in military operations 
and intelligence gathering activities. It can also do so by promoting the 
development of a SMD, by converging spending pools via P&S, by 
advancing ‘defense economics’, bolstering the EDTIB, and filling the gap 
between its ambitions and structures, tools and capabilities. European 
defense integration can also be continued by enhancing integrated military 
capabilities, by pursuing common program management, logistics, updates 
for configuration, doctrines, deployment, training and exercise, and by 
continuing to entertain the CSM, CARD, and MPCC. 
Above all, the political apex of the European defense integration triangle 
has substantially overpowered its economic and legal bases, which contain 
the necessary impetus for the EU to evolve its defense capabilities. An 
unwavering commitment to the recent activation of PESCO, increasing the 
extent of P&S, and facilitating a protectionist SMD are the most conducive 
solutions for rendering a fully harmonized ESDU that does not undermine 
the long-standing US-centric power structure via NATO as Europe begins 
to measure up to its obligations in securing its territories and defending its 
citizens under a consensual and united defense shield that does not impinge 
upon each member state’s own national security measures as stipulated in 
Article 4 of the TEU74. While citizens demand more security and defense 
concessions from the EU, it is chiefly politics and a tender history to blame 
for blockading European defense gains over the last century that have 
overridden the legal and economic conduits for a ESDU contained within 
the Treaties and defense economics. In agreement with former HR of the 
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CFSP Javier Solana, a united European defense union to provide a 
collective European response75 to outbreaking crises and security threats 
would only complement the existing US-NATO power structure, and may 
the recent establishment of PESCO be the verge of a new constitutional 
treaty for a ‘United States of Europe’ as called for by Martin Schulz in 
December 2017, who clasps Jean Monnet and the Founding Fathers’ dream 
of a federal Europe in his fingertips. This birth of a European Security and 
Defense Union will ultimately foster a redefined transatlantic relationship 
of cooperation between the European Union and United States of America 
as two of the world’s premier collaborators of global security, seekers of 
justice, and exemplars of democratic rule of law and moral authority in all 
their faults. A stronger Europe can indeed rise to the occasion without 
undermining the traditional US-NATO power structure, which is 
indispensable in a dawning 2020s decade of zealous great power 
competition, uncharted political waters and unfinished globality76. So long 
as the EU is able to walk the talk in its latest defense breakthroughs to more 
effectively diffuse peace, stability, and security throughout its own 
territories and beyond, the once far-fetched dream of a European Security 
and Defense Union from skittishness to reality has only begun.  
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